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AIDS: THE LIFE AND DEATH CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
BLOOD DONORS AND THE RECOVERY
OF BLOOD RECIPIENTS
The emergence of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS)1 epidemic in 1981 spawned litigation of sensitive issues relating
to its spread.2 The virus attacks the body's immune system, rendering
1. Congress defines AIDS as:
[A] severe collapse of the body's natural abilities to fight off infection. AIDS is the
final stage of the disease believed to be caused by infection with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV). While AIDS is the most well-known and well-studied
stage of illness, it is part of a spectrum of progressively more serious illnesses now
believed to result from HIV. Generally, people do not die of HIV infection or the
immune deficiency itself, but rather of the so-called opportunistic infections and
conditions that arise as the immune system is destroyed by HIV infection.
H.R, REP. No. 363, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 23 (1990).
The most common infections are a specific pneumonia (Pneumocystis Carinii pneu-
monia) and specific skin cancer (Kaposi's Sarcoma). Id.
2. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833
(5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a licensed practical nurse was not denied equal protection
when discharged for refusing to submit results of an HIV test); Weaver v. Reagen, 886
F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a state could not deny Medicaid coverage of
AZT to AIDS patients who were eligible for Medicaid and whose doctors had certified
that AZT was a medically necessary treatment); Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an employer
discriminated against an employee on the basis of a physical handicap in violation of the
Fair Employment and Housing Act by discharging the employee solely because the
employee was diagnosed as having AIDS); Wiggens v. State, 554 A.2d 356, 361-62 (Md.
1989) (noting that the wearing of gloves by guards during the prosecution of defendant
who was suspected of having AIDS undermined the fairness of the fact-finding process
and diluted due process principles); Life Ins. Ass'n of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins.,
530 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Mass. 1988) (finding that the Commissioner of Insurance did not
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victims unable to fight infections which eventually kill them.3 In July,
1982, the medical community suspected that AIDS may be transmitted
through the blood stream4 after observing that patients receiving blood
transfusions were contracting the puzzling new disease.' At that time,
institutions receiving blood donations had no specific screening proce-
dures to detect the HIV virus.6 Once the medical community con-
firmed that blood transfusions were one source of the spread of AIDS,7
plaintiffs contracting the virus sued the blood gathering agencies under
strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence theories.'
have implied authority to restrict underwriting practices of an insurance company with
regard to testing prospective insureds for exposure to the AIDS virus).
3. Peter J. Nanula, Comment, Protecting Confidentiality in the Effort to Control
AIDS, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 315, 316 (1986).
4. See generally Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) for
an overview of the history of the AIDS virus.
5. Id. at 1051. It is estimated that 200,000 people have AIDS and that approxi-
mately 1-1.5 million are infected with HIV. AIDS Issues (Part 3): Hearings Before the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the United States House of Representatives,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1989). The expected mortality rate is 100%. Sharon L.
Dieringer, Comment, Blood Donation: A Gift ofLife or a Death Sentence?, 22 AKRON L.
REv. 623, 623 (1989).
6. Before information on AIDS was available, blood agencies screened potential do-
nors to avoid accepting undesirable blood. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v.
District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1988). However, donors were excluded only
on the bases of medical histories of exposure to hepatitis or syphilis, history of blood
disease, tuberculosis, malaria, cancer, heart problems, epilepsy, unexplained weight loss,
or medication. Id. Potential donors were given an AIDS information sheet describing
the risks of donating HIV positive blood and were then asked yes/no questions directed
at their medical history. The donated blood was only tested for hepatitis B, syphilis and
various antibodies, not including HIV. Id at 1006.
In 1983, representatives of the American Red Cross, the Center for Disease Control,
the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the American
Association of Blood Bankers, the National Gay Task Force, and various other blood
banking and public health organizations addressed the possibility of screening out male
homosexuals, but decided that the "procedure would be 'intrusive,' 'unethical,' and
might institutionalize a stigma on groups already prone to prejudice and persecution."
Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1051-52. Furthermore, the Workgroup questioned the effective-
ness of such a procedure because potential donors might conclude that they are not at
risk. Id. at 1052 (citing Exhibit E-3 to ARC's Motion for Summary Judgment).
7. AIDS is transmitted "only through the exchange of semen or cervical or vaginal
secretions during sexual contact, from transfusions of blood products that have been
contaminated with the virus, by the shared use of hypodermic needles that have been
contaminated, and between an infected pregnant woman and her fetus." Richard
Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 28 (Harlon L. Dalton et al.
eds., 1987). It was not until 1984 that the medical community concluded that AIDS
was transmitted through the blood stream. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052.
8. For a discussion of the various theories of recovery in AIDS-related litigation, see
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Because the incubation period for AIDS is several years,9 the virus has
recently begun to emerge in donees who received blood prior to the use
of more effective screening procedures.1" Most plaintiffs assert that the
blood bank's negligent screening processes proximately caused the ill-
ness and subsequent deaths of blood recipients." In order to prevail
generally Karen S. Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986). A plaintiff is not
likely to prevail under either the theory of strict liability or implied warranty because
most states have enacted statutes rendering blood donor services and hospitals liable
only if the plaintiff can establish negligence. Id. at 135. For a discussion of negligence
and strict liability theories in a law suit involving blood donations, see Rogers v. Miles
Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Wash. 1991) (holding that Washington's blood shield
statute is not applicable and that the proper tort standard for manufacturers of blood
and blood products is that of negligence, not strict liability as set forth in comment k of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402(A) (1965)); Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1059 (not-
ing that the furnishing of blood is more in the nature of a service than a sale of goods)
(citing Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1134 (D.C. 1979)).
9. "There is thought to be a long period (up to 7 years) between exposure to [the
HIV virus] and development of AIDS." Nanula, supra note 3, at 317. Life-table analy-
sis suggests that AIDS will develop in about half of infected recipients. J. W. Ward et
al., The Natural History of Transfusion-Associated Infection with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus. Factors Influencing the Rate of Progression to Disease, 321 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 947-52 (Oct. 5, 1989).
10. See, eg., Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1990)
(recipient of transfusion in 1981 diagnosed with AIDS in 1987); Doe v. Puget Sound
Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 372 (Wash. 1991) (plaintiff transfused in 1984 died from
AIDS-related illness in 1988); Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (open heart surgery patient receiving donation in 1984 tested HIV
positive in 1987 and has not yet tested positive for the AIDS virus), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318
(1991).
Not until 1985 did the FDA first license testing kits known as the ELISA test, which
could accurately detect the HIV virus. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District
Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Colo. 1988). The laboratory test has proven 98.6% effec-
tive in detecting the HIV antibody. Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1053. When the ELISA test
is coupled with a second test, the Western Blot Analysis, the AIDS exposure detection
rate increases to 100%. Id. The federal government now requires blood agencies to test
all donated blood. Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Requirements, 21 C.F.R.
§ 610.45 (1988) states in part:
(a) Testing requirements. (1) Each donation of human blood or blood components
intended for use in preparing a product shall be tested for antibody to HIV by a
test approved for such use by FDA....
11. Plaintiffs typically assert that the blood institution "knew or should have known
that AIDS was transmissible through blood and should have screened donors and im-
plemented laboratory tests to eliminate contaminated blood." Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at
1056. Some courts reject this line of reasoning because, at the time of transfusion, the
defendant blood banks had no means to screen AIDS carriers. See, ag., Doe v. Univer-
sity of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's dis-
covery request because "the infected blood was donated prior to the time an effective
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on the merits, the plaintiffs often request the donors' names and ad-
dresses through the discovery process to determine whether any of the
donors have AIDS or have tested positive for the HIV virus.12
This Note analyzes the conflicts that courts face in balancing a plain-
tiff's right to discover a blood donor's identity under the rules of dis-
covery against the donor's right to privacy, as well as the nation's
interest in maintaining a healthy and adequate blood supply. Part I
discusses a plaintiff's right to discovery under Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or comparable state procedural rules. 3 Part
II analyzes a blood donor's constitutional right to privacy. Part III
discusses the application of the physician-patient privilege to the rela-
tionship between blood banks and donors. Part IV focuses on public
policy arguments regarding the national blood supply. Finally, Part V
proposes possible formulas to resolve each of these conflicting interests.
I. DISCOVERY RIGHTS UNDER RULE 26 OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center,14 a plaintiff gave birth to her
first child in 1984. Because of post-partum hemorrhaging, she received
a blood transfusion.' In 1987, the blood center advised the plaintiff
that the donor who supplied her with the blood had tested positive for
the AIDS virus. 6 Subsequently, the plaintiff also tested positive for
the disease." Prior to the plaintiff's transfusion, the blood center had
test for the disease had been developed"); Lipton, supra note 8, at 150-51 (stating that,
with respect to the time period before HIV antibody testing, "a blood collecting organi-
zation adhering to the American Association of Blood Banks standards and implement-
ing all of the screening methodologies recommended by the FDA should not be found
to have breached a duty of care to prevent the transmission of... [AIDS] through the
blood supply"). But see Doe v. University Hosp., 561 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990) (holding that the unavailability of a screening test for AIDS prior to 1985 does
not foreclose plaintiff's negligence claims arising from a 1984 transfusion).
12. See Cheryl R. Zwart, Note, Aids: A Threat to Blood Donor Anonymity, 66 NEB.
L. REv. 863, 863 (1987). See also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 320-21 (N.J.
1991) (Pollock, J., concurring) (noting the stark division among states and courts re-
garding the rights of an AIDS-infected donee to discover the donor).
13. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) (noting that most
states have modeled discovery provisions after Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
14. 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991).
15. Id. at 372.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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abandoned a policy excluding gay men from donating blood. Surpris-
ingly, the donor testified on the plaintiff's behalf at trial.18 The donor,
a homosexual male who had been in a long-term monogamous rela-
tionship, testified that he would not have donated blood if the center
had requested that gay men refrain from donating blood, or had asked
gay men not to donate if they were unsure of their partner's sexual
history. 9 In addition, expert testimony indicated that the blood
center's screening procedures were exceedingly poor.20 The jury
awarded nearly two million dollars to the plaintiff and her family.2
Unfortunately, most persons who contract AIDS via blood transfu-
sions do not receive the benefit of the donor's testimony or even his or
her deposition. Pre-1985 transfusion AIDS cases are typically difficult
for plaintiffs to win2 2 and involve extensive battles over discovery
rights.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure affords litigants a
broad opportunity to obtain relevant information.23 Despite this lib-
18. AIDS 1-8M Verdict Stands as New Trial Denied; Donor Testified at Trial for
Plaintiffs, Toxics L. DAILY (BNA), Jan. 10, 1991, at 12.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. at 11. To maintain a cause of action under a negligence theory, a plaintiff
must prove the following: "(1) a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm; (2) breach of the duty; (3) a
causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and, (4) actual loss or damage."
Lipton, supra note 8, at 139-40.
23. Maria S. Kirsh, Note, AIDS Anonymity in Donation Situations-Where Public
Benefit Meets Private Good, 69 B.U. L. REv. 187, 190 (1989) (explaining the broad
nature of Rule 26 and possible limitations through protective orders). Section 26(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The scope of discovery is broadly defined to facilitate the disclosure of the true facts
in a controversy instead of allowing their concealment. Zwart, supra note 12, at 863-64
(citing City of Edmond v. Parr, 587 P.2d 56, 57 (Okla. 1978)). Broad discovery helps to
eliminate surprise at trial, simplifies the issues and promotes the settlement of cases. Id.
at 864 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984)). See also Doe v.
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eral scope of discovery, defendant blood banks faced with a request for
the donor's identity typically move for protective orders pursuant to
Rule 26(c).24 Courts recognize that discovery matters are within their
sound discretion and that they must protect the interests of the parties
against possible abuse.25 A judge must balance the parties' competing
interests to determine if there is "good cause" to issue a protective or-
der.26 Determining "good cause" involves balancing one party's inter-
est in discovering evidence to enhance his cause of action against the
other party's, or a third person's, interest in keeping the information
confidential.27 In deciding whether to grant a protective order against
disclosure of a donor's identity, courts must weigh the plaintiffs' inter-
est in establishing causation and refuting claims that the virus was con-
tracted elsewhere28 against the defendants' assertions of humiliation to
Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 376 (Wash. 1991) (noting that all individuals
have a right to access the courts and "extensive discovery is necessary to effectively
pursue either a plaintiff's claim or a defendant's defense").
24. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in part:
Upon a motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to
be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). "When determining the extent materials sought to be
discovered may be protected, the trial court must balance the competing interests that
would be served by granting or denying discovery." Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr.
v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1010 (Colo. 1988) (citing Bond v. District Court, 682
P.2d 33 (Colo. 1984)). "The balancing test is accomplished by weighing the respective
parties' interests in discovery of material facts against... a public policy interest in confi-
dentiality." Id. (citing Liedholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo. 1980)).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d
1545 (1 lth Cir. 1985). In Farnsworth, plaintiffs filed a products liability action against a
tampon manufacturer for injuries suffered from toxic shock syndrome (TSS). Id. at
1546. The manufacturer sought to discover names and addresses of women who had
participated in TSS research. Id. The Center for Disease Control, the nonparty sub-
poenaed for the information, filed a motion for a protective order. Id. The 11 th Circuit
conceded that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery when-
ever possible." Id at 1547. The court also acknowledged that, although ruling for a
protective order requires good cause, courts have a duty to balance opposing interests in
obtaining information and in keeping that information confidential. Id. The Farns-
worth court held that the interest in keeping the names of participants in the TSS study
confidential outweighed the discovery interests of the tampon manufacturer. Id. The
court further noted that section 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives
courts discretion to fashion protective orders as they see fit. Id. at 1548.
27. 758 F.2d at 1547.
28. Denise C. Andresen, Note, AIDS-Related Litigation: The Competing Interests
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the donor and inadequacy of the blood supply.29
Courts are split on the scope of discovery in AIDS-related litiga-
tion.3" Because AIDS testing procedures were not in effect during the
Surrounding Discovery of Blood Donors' Identities, 19 IND. L. Rv. 561, 569 (1986).
Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (plaintiffs
asserting that "donors may have relevant information as to the accuracy and/or negli-
gence" of blood screening methods); see also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 324-25
(N.J. 1991) (Pollock, J., concurring) (noting plaintiffs' strong interest in discovery in
light of the blood bank's categorical denial of negligence or causation); Tarrant County
Hasp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a hospi-
tal made no effort to determine whether any if its donors had AIDS and merely sought
a blanket denial).
29. See, eg., Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988) (explaining defendant's argument that the donor has an expectation of confidenti-
ality and society has an interest in maintaining an adequate blood supply).
30. Some courts issue a protective order pursuant to section 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D.
78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (finding that a protective order precluding the release of donor
identities is warranted because of concern with donors' privacy rights and danger to the
nation's blood supply); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (holding that "plaintiffs' discovery needs are outweighed by the societal
interest in an adequate and safe blood supply"); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Serv., 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989) (holding that "society's interest in maintain-
ing an adequate and safe supply of volunteer blood, coupled with the donor's interest in
privacy, far outweighs plaintiffs interest in questioning the donor"); Doe v. University
of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "the harm which
could result from disclosure ... when balanced under Civ. R. 26(c), [is] paramount to
plaintiff's interests in pretrial discovery"); Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500
So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987) (noting that the probative value of plaintiff's discovery needs
is dubious in light of the significant harm to donors in permitting a fishing expedition).
Other courts have limited the protective order. See, eg., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc.,
127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (allowing the plaintiff to depose the donor with-
out the donor giving his or her name, address, social security number, or any other
identifying information); Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr. of Hopkins County, 121
F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (concluding that the donor should be required to
comply with discovery, but that his or her identity should be kept confidential and
revealed only to limited persons); Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 811 P.2d 424, 432
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that "[i]n order to obtain sufficient information regarding
screening and testing procedures, a patient is entitled to have controlled access to the
donor for discovery"); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 372 (Wash. 1991)
(affirming the trial court's order requiring written disclosure of information including
the donor's name, address, phone number, and social security number to be revealed
when the donor is named as defendant); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood
Bank, 818 P.2d 1056, 1058-62 (Wash. 1991) (granting the plaintiff access to donor's
medical records, interrogatories, and a videotape deposition with donor's face obscured,
but denying disclosure of donor's identity); Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 315
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (finding the patient was entitled to learn the name of
the donor, under controlled discovery processes), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Sten-
ger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (ordering the
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time that the plaintiffs received the blood transfusions, plaintiffs urge
that donors' depositions could reveal inadequacies in an agency's
screening procedures.31 In addition, the donor's identity could reveal
that the donor has AIDS, is in a high risk group, or has subsequently
tested positive for the HIV virus.32 Such factors might indicate that
court on remand to fashion an order permitting the plaintiffs to learn the screening
procedure at the time of the donation at issue, while protecting the identity and confi-
dentiality of the donor); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d
1003, 1013 (Colo. 1988) (holding that a patient's interest in obtaining controlled access
to a donor to discover whether screening procedures were followed outweighed the do-
nor's interest in privacy).
One court went so far as to allow full disclosure of the donor's identity, but prohib-
ited the plaintiffs from further contacting the donor without court approval. See, e.g.,
Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that due process rights of blood donors did not protect their identities from
controlled disclosure); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding the plaintiff's interest in learning the identity of the donor
legitimate because without the information, the plaintiff would not be able to prosecute
her cause of action).
31. See, e.g., Most v. Tulane Medical Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991) (find-
ing that plaintiffs need the donor's identity in order to determine the screening process
because the materials offered by the blood bank failed to indicate whether it followed
procedures); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (stating that the need for the information in these cases cannot be characterized as
"dubious at best" because plaintiffs legitimately need to question the donors about the
screening procedures to determine if procedures were adequately followed). Questions
highly pertinent to the issue of negligence which are only available from the donor
include:
Did the donor here have [AIDS] symptoms [when he donated blood]? Was he
asked about them? Was he physically examined in this respect? Was he given the
appropriate high-risk group self-screening information? Was a reasonable effort
made to determine if he was in a high-risk category? Were his responses to the
medical history questions accurately recorded? Were the questions adequately ex-
plained to him? Would present screening requirements, short of laboratory testing,
have revealed his AIDS infection?
Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 593
A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991). The only method in effect before 1985 (when the serological
testing of blood for HIV antibodies was implemented) was self-deferral. See Zwart,
supra note 12, at 865-66 stating that "[b]ecause transfusion-related AIDS is not a 'thing
of the past,' the issue of donor confidentiality and the right to avoid discovery is not a
moot issue").
32. Samson et al., Identification of HIV-infected Transfusion Recipients: the Utility
of Crossreferencing Previous Donor Records With AIDS Case Reports, 30 TRANSFUSION
214-18 (Mar-Apr 1990).
An expanded 'look-back' program has been developed, in which patients who may
have been exposed to HIV through blood transfusions were identified via three
triggers: the blood that they received was donated by persons who 1) have subse-
quently been reported to local health departments as meeting the diagnostic criteria
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/18
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the donated blood was the source of plaintiffs' AIDS.33
Blood centers, on the other hand, argue vigorously that a protective
order is warranted because discovery of the donors' identities would
cause the donors "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden. ' 34 The centers assert that the donors have a more compelling
interest in avoiding potentially "devastating effects on employment, in-
surability," and reputation.35 Moreover, defendants allege a chilling
effect on the availability of volunteer blood donors.36 In balancing the
conflicting interests of all of the parties involved, it is imperative to
recognize that both sides have much at stake. Therefore, a court must
carefully scrutinize each argument and fashion the most equitable
resolution.37
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Although not specifically enumerated in the United States Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the right to privacy.3" In
for AIDS, 2) have donated since the introduction of anti-HIV screening and tested
positive, or 3) have been found to be infected during investigation of reported
transfusion-associated HIV infections.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Snyder, 582 A.2d at 314 (holding that the defendants' unwillingness to
admit that the donor's blood was contaminated entitled the plaintiff to seek direct proof
that the donor was HIV positive at the time of transfusion).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See supra note 24 for the pertinent part of Rule 26(c).
35. Kirsh, supra note 23, at 193. See also Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d
370, 376 (Wash. 1991) (citing the petitioner's brief which asserted that disclosure of the
donor's identity would "threaten family relationships, job security, employability, and
ability to obtain credit, insurance and housing").
36. South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that an important means of attaining the goal of a healthy blood
supply is through an all-voluntary blood donation system because donated blood is less
likely to be contaminated with infectious diseases than that of paid donors). Rasmussen
v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1987) (finding that the pros-
pect of inquiry into donors' private lives would deter blood donation and add further to
the unnecessary reduction in blood donors because of the baseless fear that donation can
transmit the virus). But see Puget Sound, 819 P.2d at 378-79 (dismissing this argument
as mere speculation about human conduct).
37. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.
1985) ("Rule 26(c) gives the district court discretionary power to fashion a protective
order").
38. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 456-62 (1977)
(holding that, although the President had a legitimate expectation of privacy in personal
communications, an Act allowing screening of his materials was not an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (finding that requiring
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the landmark case, Griswold v. Connecticut,39 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a constitutional right to privacy based upon a penumbra of
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.' The Supreme Court has spe-
cifically expressed that a constitutional right to privacy exists in mari-
tal activities, procreation, family matters, child rearing and education,
and contraception.41 The Supreme Court has declined to hold that the
right to privacy against disclosure of confidential information is specifi-
cally enumerated in the United States Constitution.42
In Whalen v. Roe,43 a state statute required the filing of patients'
names and addresses who obtained, pursuant to a doctor's prescription,
drugs which had both lawful and unlawful uses." The physicians and
patients challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground
that the statute violated their protected "zone of privacy"45 and would
adversely affect their reputations if the information became public. 4
This threat, they argued, would make physicians hesitant to prescribe
needed drugs, and patients hesitant to pursue health care.47 Although
the Court recognized that every individual possesses the right to pri-
disclosure to the state of the names of patients using Schedule II drugs does not auto-
matically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155-56 (1973) (holding that a state prohibition of abortion must be strictly necessary to
the achievement of a compelling state interest in order to override a woman's right to
privacy in childbearing matters); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)
(finding a right to privacy in marital decisions involving contraception).
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Id. at 484-85. The Court found that a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of
contraceptives violated the implied constitutional right to marital privacy. Id. at 485.
41. Andresen, supra note 28, at 576 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
42. Lipton, supra note 8, at 174.
43. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
44. Id at 591-93. The purpose of the statute was to prevent the use of stolen or
revised prescriptions, to "prevent unscrupulous pharmacists from repeatedly refilling
prescriptions, to prevent users from obtaining prescriptions from more than one doctor,
[and] to prevent doctors from over-prescribing." Id at 592.
45. Id. at 598. The court noted that cases involving rights to privacy contain an
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and an "interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 599-600. Even
though the boundaries of the constitutional right to privacy have not been succinctly
defined, its application has been limited to only protecting rights so personal that they
are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Andresen, supra
note 28, at 576 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).
46. 429 U.S. at 600.
47. Id
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vacy,48 this right is not absolute.4 9 The Court held that the impact of
the statute on either the patients' reputation or independence was in-
sufficient to constitute an invasion of the right to privacy.5 °
Because there is no general constitutional right to privacy, protec-
tion is left to the states.5 Therefore, a person's claim to privacy is
subject to a balancing of interests.5 2 The court in Rasmussen v. South
Florida Blood Serv. 5 3 was the first to discuss privacy interests involved
in the discovery of donors' identities in a transfusion-related AIDS
case.54 In Rasmussen, an accident victim received fifty-one units of
blood via transfusion and died of AIDS two years later.5 5 In an at-
tempt to prove that the blood transfusion was the source of the AIDS,
the decedent's estate sought information containing the blood donors'
48. Id at 598 n.23.
49. Id. at 602. The Court explained that "[r]equiring such disclosures to represent-
atives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community, does not auto-
matically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy." Id.
50. 429 U.S. at 603-04. The Court used a balancing test to determine whether the
physicians' and patients' privacy rights were greater than the social benefit derived
through the statute. Id. at 598-604. The Court concluded that the State had a legiti-
mate interest in the information and the statute adequately protected against public
disclosure. Id at 603.
51. 53. Id. at 607-08 (Stewart, J., concurring)(citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 350, 350-51).
52. Robert K. Jenner, Identifying HIV-Infected Blood Donors: Who is 'John Do-
nor'?, TRIAL, June 1989 at 47, 48. Many states have enacted statutes "intended to
protect the confidentiality of individual AIDS records while assuring their limited avail-
ability for essential health, scientific and other legitimate purposes." Snyder v. Mekh-
jian, 582 A.2d 307, 314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J.
1991). Unless the statute expressly provides for disclosure, the records may be obtained
only by a court order for good cause. This requires the court to "weigh the public
interest and need for disclosure against the injury to the person who is the subject of the
record." Id.
See also Nanula, supra note 3, at 346 proposing, in part:
The results of an AIDS blood test may be disclosed under a lawful court order, as
follows:
a. if personally identifying information is subpoenaed, the [state department of
health] shall seek and the court shall issue a protective order keeping this informa-
tion confidential; and
b. the court order shall limit the use and disclosure of records, require deletion
of personally identifying information, provide sanctions for misuse of records, and
set forth other methods for assuring confidentiality.
Id.
53. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
54. Jenner, supra note 52, at 48.
55. 500 So. 2d at 534.
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names and addresses.56 The Florida court denied discovery, noting
that the Florida right to privacy extends protection against disclosure
of information relating to all facets of an individual's life.57 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that "AIDS is the
modem day equivalent of leprosy. AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can
lead to discrimination in employment, education, housing and even
medical treatment."58
Although some courts have followed the Rasmussen rationale,59 the
impact of its holding has diminished as AIDS-related litigation has in-
creased. More recent cases have found that the donor's interest in pri-
vacy is not fundamental and, therefore, does not warrant full
protection.' Most recently, Snyder v. Mekhjian 6' followed the grow-
56. Id. Plaintiff's interest was in establishing that one or more of the donors either
had AIDS or was in a high risk group. Id. at 537.
57. Id. at 536-38. The court explained that "[w]e cannot ignore, therefore, the con-
sequences of disclosure to nonparties, including the possibility that a donor's co-work-
ers, friends, employers, and others may be queried as to the donor's sexual preferences,
drug use, or general life-style." Id. at 537. But see Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that "the incidental burden on a defendant in forcing him
to disclose details of his sex life is not sufficient to outweigh the strong interest in
preventing the spread of communicable sexual diseases").
58. 500 So. 2d at 537 (citing South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d
798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
59. See, e.g., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 656(D.S.C. 1989) (finding support in Rasmussen to deny motions to compel discovery of
blood donors' identities); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 424 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988) (finding the Rasmussen rationale persuasive).
60. See, e.g., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125-26 (W.D. La. 1989)
(finding that, although a donor has a privacy interest in remaining anonymous, the
plaintiff must be able to prosecute his claim); Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr. of Hop-
kins County, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (rejecting a donor's constitutional
claim to privacy when the plaintiff was trying to press a claim); Doe v. Puget Sound
Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 376 (Wash. 1991) (declining to entertain a privacy argument
similar to Rasmussen because the donor had died and therefore the reasons for confi-
dentiality had disappeared); Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 314-15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (finding where litigant's discovery need cannot otherwise be met, and it
is possible to accommodate that need with limited intrusion, access under court supervi-
sion is justifiable), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr.,
563 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (noting that restrictions guaranteeing the lim-
ited scope of questioning will protect the donor while allowing plaintiffs to pursue their
legitimate claim); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003,
1013 (Colo. 1988) (finding that the plaintiffs' interests in pursuing their claim outweigh
the donor's privacy interest); Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d
557, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant has not established a societal
interest paramount to the plaintiff's right to discover the donor's identity); Tarrant
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol42/iss1/18
BLOOD DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY
ing trend of cases allowing discovery in a limited capacity. 62 Noting
that the plaintiff could not prove the blood center's negligence without
information from the donor, the New Jersey court carefully crafted an
order giving the plaintiff a reasonable discovery opportunity at the least
possible cost to the donor's confidentiality interests.63 The Snyder
court ordered the lower court on remand to determine the best proce-
dure to protect both the plaintiff's and donor's interests." The court
noted that the donor's name would not need to be supplied if the lower
court allowed a veiled deposition or an anonymous questionnaire.65
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the decision
based upon the reasons expressed in the appellate division opinion.6 6
The conflicting views between the Rasmussen court and the Snyder
court illustrate the varying significance that courts place on a donor's
right to privacy.67 Perhaps the most compelling argument against the
County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming the
trial court's order compelling identification of blood donors).
61. 582 A.2d 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
62. See, eg., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (al-
lowing the deposition of a donor, but limited identification of the donor as Donor X);
Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr. of Hopkins County, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky.
1988) (allowing discovery but keeping the donor's name confidential); Doe v. Puget
Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 379 (Wash. 1991) (upholding an order requiring de-
fendant blood center to disclose information about the donor including name and ad-
dress); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 818 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Wash.
1991) (finding that an order allowing a videotaped deposition of a donor with his face
obscured sufficiently accommodated both the plaintiff's discovery interest and the do-
nor's privacy interest); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa.
Super. Ct, 1989) (suggesting that a donor may be identified by numbers or "some other
method of protecting his or her identity"); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District
Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1013 (Colo. 1988) (ordering that a donor submit to a written
deposition while having his identity protected).
63. 582 A.2d at 315.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 593 A.2d 318, 319 (N.J. 1991). The concurring opinion agreed that courts can
limit discovery orders to avoid excessive intrusions into private and personal matters
and that the appellate division's order adequately protected the donor. Id. at 325 (Pol-
lock, J., concurring). However, the concurrence addressed the significant privacy issues
involved in AIDS litigation. The judge noted that "no disease in modem history has
engendered so much attention, fear, and even hysteria as AIDS." Id. at 323. Because
AIDS victims "confront not only a deadly disease, but ostracism," human decency re-
quires limits on discovery in civil litigation. Id.
67. See Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1988)
which discusses several court decisions considering the question of blood donor privacy:
While... Rasmussen extend[s] the holding of Whalen v. Roe to recognize a consti-
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discovery of the donor's identity is the stigma that attaches to a person
who either has the disease or is associated with a high risk group.68
The majority of AIDS victims are either homosexuals or intravenous
drug users-groups that society has historically ostracized. 69 The dis-
senting judge in the Rasmussen lower court opinion noted that if the
donors are within a high risk group, their "right to privacy" must give
way to disclosing and paying the price for the grievous harm that they
may have caused.7 ° Such an opinion promotes detailed investigations
into the donor's private sexual and social behavior, and possibly fur-
ther discrimination against AIDS victims.71
tutional right of privacy against disclosure of personal matters, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not ventured quite so far....
We therefore, conclude that the claim of constitutionally protected blood donor
privacy.., is a claim beyond the boundaries of the right of privacy as established
by the United States Supreme Court....
Id at 302-03. See also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 320-21 (N.J. 1991) (Pollock,
J., concurring) (listing recent cases which have divided on the issues of blood donor
privacy and plaintiff discovery rights). But see Kirsh, supra note 23, at 205. "In the
context of blood donor confidentiality ... both the potential invasion into the most
personal aspects of a donor's life and the donor's expectation of confidentiality should
elevate the individual's interest in anonymity to that of a fundamental privacy right that
should be strictly protected." Id. The plaintiff's interest in compensation and society's
interest in fair and effective litigation cannot override the donor's compelling interest.
Id.
68. See generally Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla.
1987). The Rasmussen court stated that "[d]isclosure of donor identities in any context
involving AIDS could be extremely disruptive and even devastating to the individual
donor. If the requested information is released, and petitioner queries the donors'
friends and fellow employees, it will be functionally impossible to prevent occasional
references to AIDS." Id. at 537.
69. Id at 536. One author points out that "[o]nly particular classes of people, such
as drug users, prostitutes and homosexuals, most of them already vulnerable to possible
social stigma and even criminal penalties, have been identified as being at risk for
AIDS." Nanula, supra note 3, at 317. But see Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 536-37 (in-
cluding hemophiliacs, heterosexual partners of AIDS victims, and blood transfusion
recipients in the AIDS high risk category).
70. South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)(Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
71. See Kirsh, supra note 23, at 201 (stating that the dissenting judge in Rasmussen
believed that an at-risk donor is worthy of scorn regardless of knowledge of his inclu-
sion in a high risk group at the time of donation). The author asserts that "the only
effective order is one that completely protects the confidentiality of the donor." Id. at
203. See also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 323 (N.J. 1991) (Pollock, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "unrestricted discovery could lead to inquiries about such matters as
the identity of the donor's sexual partners, the donor's sexual habits, and his or her use
of intravenous drugs").
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However, recent courts, such as the Snyder court, are sensitive to
both the plaintiff's right to recovery and the donor's privacy interests.
Absent public disclosure, the fears expressed in Rasmussen are un-
founded.7 2 Moreover, blood institutions who are more interested in
protecting themselves from liability than protecting a "fundamental
right" of blood donors, assert the donors' right to privacy.7 3 The true
motives of the blood agencies, coupled with the courts' power to pro-
tect the donor from public exploitation, tips the scale in favor of
discovery.74
III. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Closely tied to a constitutional right to privacy, blood institutions
argue that confidentiality is protected by the physician-patient privi-
lege. The Code of Federal Regulations allows qualified physicians or
trained, supervised assistants to collect blood." Blood banks contend
that nurses working under the supervision of a physician fall within the
confines of the applicable physician-patient privilege statute; therefore,
the records containing donor identities are protected.7 6 This concept,
is difficult to apply, however, because blood banks are not physicians,
and donors are not patients.7 7
Blood institutions assert that the policies underlying the physician-
72. Andresen, supra note 28, at 584. Public disclosure of the donors' identities is
not necessary and discovery is subject to judicial control. Id.
73. Id. at 585. The author notes that "blood organizations may assert these rights
on the pretext of protecting donors while, in reality, they are attempting to insulate
themselves from liability." Id. See also Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370,
376 (Wash. 1991) (recognizing the blood center's necessity to establish its standing to
assert the constitutional rights of the donor and the donor's family); Pflaum v. Psychol-
ogy Examining Bd., 331 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that "[t]he
right of privacy is limited to those personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental,' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' ").
74. The privacy argument would be more compelling if the donors were parties to
the litigation. Andresen, supra note 28, at 586.
75. Jenner, supra note 52, at 51 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 640.4 (1984)). 21 C.F.R.
§ 640.4(a) (1991) provides that "[b]lood shall be drawn from the donor by a qualified
physician or under his supervision by assistants trained in the procedure." Id.
76. Jenner, supra note 52, at 51. See also Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538
N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to extend the physician-patient privi-
lege to a blood institution's collection of a donor's blood).
77. Zwart, supra note 12, at 878. "The relationship between a patient and physician
is based on the patient's need for the physician's expertise. This differs from the rela-
tionship between a donor and blood bank. The donor and blood bank work together
not to afford a benefit to either of them, but to a third person." Id.
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patient privilege apply equally as well to the institutions' relationship
with its donors.78 The central purpose of the physician-patient privi-
lege of confidentiality is to promote the free disclosure of information
between the physician and patient and to prevent the patient from po-
tential embarrassment and invasion of privacy resulting from a disclo-
sure.7 9 Blood banks contend that if donors believe that their private
communications could be disclosed, donors will be deterred from hon-
est disclosure and will lose faith in the fiduciary relationship created
between blood banks and donors. 80
Although the physician-patient privilege may differ according to
each state's applicable statute, most statutes require proof of a physi-
cian, a patient, and a communication." Because courts strictly con-
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983). The issue before
the court was whether a person who submitted to tissue typing tests for the purpose of
determining suitability as a donor was a "patient" protected from public disclosure. Id.
at 872. The court found that "[o]nce a [blood] donor is accepted . . . his person is
unquestionably placed under the control of the hospital personnel operating the labora-
tory, and he must rely on their professional skills as in any other hospital-patient rela-
tionship." Id at 876 (quoting Smith v. Hospital Auth., 287 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981)). The court further reasoned that the hospitals' duty to protect confidential-
ity should not depend on whether the procedure is for that person's benefit or the benefit
of someone else. Id. In both cases, the fiduciary relationship is the same. Id.
81. Jenner, supra note 52, at 51. See, ag., CAL. EVID. § 994 (West 1966 & Supp.
1992) ("[Ihe patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose... a
confidential communication between patient and physician.. ."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 8-802 (1989) ("[N]o physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any
information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional
character. . ."); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums Supp. 1991) ("[P]hysicians [shall
not be competent witnesses] as to [matters] communicated to them.., by patients, in
the course of their professional business.. ."); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2157
(West Supp. 1991) ("[A] person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall
not disclose any information that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a
professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to pre-
scribe for the patient as a physician . . ."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (B)(1)
(Baldwin 1991) ("[A] physician ... [shall not testify] concerning a communication
made to him by his patient . . ."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982) ("[N]o
physician shall be allowed... to disclose any information which he acquired in attend-
ing the patient in a professional capacity.. ."); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b
§ 5.08(a) (West Supp. 1988) ("[C]ommunications between one licensed to practice
medicine, relative to or in connection with any professional services as a physician to a
patient, is confidential and privileged and may not be disclosed.. ."). But see MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(g) (West 1988) ("[A] registered nurse, psychologist or consulting
psychologist shall not.., be allowed to disclose any information.., which the profes-
sional has acquired in attending the client in a professional capacity ... ").
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strue physician-patient statutes, most courts have found that nurses
and medical technicians do not satisfy the physician requirement.82
Moreover, because a patient is generally defined as a person under
medical treatment or care, 3 donors rarely fall within the category of
"patient." In addition, courts have defined a "communication" as in-
formation concerning facts or statements necessary to enable a physi-
cian to diagnose a patient, not merely conversation. 84
The weight of authority adopts the view that the physician-patient
privilege does not apply to the relationship between blood banks and
donors.8 5 One court held, however, that a donor's confidentiality is
protected by the physician-patient privilege. In Krygier v. Airweld,
82. See, e.g., Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003,
1009 (Colo. 1988) (stating that "[t]he privilege does not include communications with
medical technicians"); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1988) (stating that the Ohio Supreme Court has refused to extend the privilege to
communications made to a nurse while performing her duties unless the nurse is also a
physician).
83. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84 -
22.1 (West 1985) defines "patient" as "a person who, for the sole purpose of securing
preventive, paliative, or curative treatment ... of his physical or mental condition,
consults a physician, or submits to an examination by a physician."
84. Jenner, supra note 52, at 51. See also Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538
N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the donor is not seeking treatment
and therefore his answers do not fall within the definition of "communication" for pur-
poses of physician-patient privilege); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107 (1)(d) (West
Supp. 1991) (restricting privileged information to "any information acquired in attend-
ing the patient which was necessary to enable [the physician, surgeon, or registered
professional nurse] to prescribe or act for the patient").
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 374 (Wash. 1991)
(holding that the physician-patient privilege does not protect a blood donor's identity);
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. 1989) (noting that a
"physician" did not perform the procedure and the donor was not acting in the role of a
"patient" seeking treatment by undergoing the procedures involved in drawing blood);
Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Colo. 1988)
(stating that the interviewer was not a medically trained physician, surgeon, or profes-
sional nurse and the privilege does not include communications with medical techni-
cians); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that a blood donor was not seeking treatment for himself and that his answers
were not "communication" for purposes of invoking the physician-patient privilege);
Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding the physician-patient privilege inapplicable because "[n]othing in the record
reflects that the blood donors were seen by a physician or received medical care when
they donated blood"). But see Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987) (finding the physician-patient privilege satisfied because the person at-
tending to the donor was "either a physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse
or phlebotomist").
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Inc. ,86 a plaintiff brought a wrongful death action arising out of a pa-
tient's exposure to AIDS-infected blood against the blood bank. 7 The
court held that New York's codification of the physician-patient privi-
lege applied to the relationship between a blood donor and the blood
bank.88 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the policy rea-
sons underlying the statute.8 9 Because the blood donor altruistically
donated his or her blood, the court stated that the law should protect
the privacy of the donors and prevent their exposure to embarrass-
ment." In addition, the Krygier court reasoned that society has a sub-
stantial interest in promoting the free flow of information between the
blood bank and the donor to ensure proper treatment.91 Although the
Krygier court found that the physician-patient privilege applied to the
relationship between a blood bank and its donors, its holding is limited
to instances in which the statute provides that information acquired by
registered nurses is privileged, and in which a registered nurse is active
in recording donor information. 92
As previously noted, most physician-patient privilege statutes apply
only to information given to a licensed physician.93 Unless the blood
bank can either demonstrate physician involvement in the donation
process or show that the applicable statute includes registered nurses,
the donors' confidentiality will remain unprotected under the physi-
86. 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
87. Id at 476.
88. Id
89. Id
90. 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
91. Id. at 476.
92. See Richard C. Bollow & Daryl J. Lapp, Protecting the Confidentiality of Blood
Donors'Identities in AIDS Litigation, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 343, 347 (1987-88) (discussing
theories advanced to protect blood donor's identity). The New York Statute, N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. § 4504 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1991) provides:
Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine,
registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry or chiropractic
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a
patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in
that capacity.
Id.
The Krygier court found that because blood is collected according to strict proce-
dures and the person attending to the donor is "either a specially trained physician,
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse or phlebotomist," the requisite physician-pa-
tient privilege is met. Krygier, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
93. Bollow & Lapp, supra note 92, at 348-49. See supra note 81 for examples of
physician-patient privilege statutes.
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cian-patient privilege argument.94 For example, the blood institution
in Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr:95 argued that disclosure of infor-
mation acquired during blood donation would violate Pennsylvania's
physician-patient privilege.96 The court found the physician-patient
privilege inapplicable, reasoning that although the Blood Center as-
serted that blood withdrawal for donation is a "medical procedure," it
did not contend that a relationship existed between a physician and
patient.97 A physician did not perform the procedure nor was the do-
nor seeking treatment.9" Most courts are in accord with the Stenger
rationale and have held the physician-patient privilege inapplicable in
the blood bank-donor relationships.99
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR A SAFE AND
ADEQUATE BLOOD SUPPLY
In addition to asserting the privacy rights of blood donors under
both the Constitution and physician-patient privilege,"° ° blood institu-
tions argue that disclosure of the donors' identities will significantly
diminish the amount of voluntary blood donations.10 1 In 1985, the
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on
94. Bollow & Lapp, supra note 92, at 349.
95. 563 A.2d 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
96. Id. at 537. "This statutory privilege found in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5929 restricts a
'physician' from disclosing information acquired while attending to a 'patient.' It was
designed to create a confidential atmosphere in which the patient would feel free to
disclose all possible information which may be useful in rendering appropriate treat-
ment." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 85 for a list of cases denying the physician-patient privilege. But
see, Lipton, supra note 8, at 168-69.
Although there are conceptual difficulties with application of the physician-patient
privilege to blood donor records... the reasons for so extending the privilege do
exist and should control. Indeed, the policy justifications that support application
of the physician-patient privilege in the typical health care context-including the
justifications of preventing embarrassment and encouraging full disclosure-apply
equally well to the blood donor context .... [Tihe expectation of the donor is that
confidentiality will be preserved.
Id.
100. See supra notes 38-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
arguments.
101. See Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 377 (Wash. 1991) (defend-
ant blood center asserting that volunteers will not donate absent confidentiality
safeguards).
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Energy and Commerce met with representatives of national blood
banks to discuss the transfusion of transmitted diseases.1 °2 The blood
institutions asserted that donor confidentiality ensures an adequate
blood supply. The blood institutions argued that potential donors
would be deterred from donating because of their fear of becoming de-
fendants in litigation or being questioned about the most intimate de-
tails of their lives."13 The blood centers also expressed a fear that the
plaintiffs may wish to misuse the information to expose the source of
the virus."° In addition, they argued that the threat of intrusion into a
donor's privacy will compel the donor to be dishonest on the question-
naire,'05 thus compromising the safety of the blood supply.1°6
Courts have been more inclined to deny discovery based upon this
argument.107 For example, in Coleman v. American Red Cross,' °8 a
blood recipient tested positive for HIV infection after the blood service
102. AIDS Issues: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-88 (1985).
103. Id. at 180 (testimony of Victor Schmitt). A spokesperson for the American
Association of Blood Banks discussed the possible repercussions of donor discovery:
Envision, if you will, a scenario in which a donor received a subpoena to appear for
a deposition regarding his or her personal activities because this donor was one of
several.., donors whose blood was received by a patient who now has AIDS. This
is not what this donor contemplated when he or she appeared, altruistically, to
donate blood. If such a scenario becomes commonplace, who in our society will be
willing to donate blood?
Id. at 179 (testimony of Dr. Joseph R. Bove, M.D.).
104. Id. at 181. "The fact that AIDS is most often perceived as a disease of homo-
sexual men and IV drug abusers probably contributes to this phenomenon." Id.
105. Id. at 180.
106. See Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 125 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D.S.C.
1989).
[T]he safety of the blood supply depends largely on donors' willingness to provide
accurate and detailed histories of private and sometimes sensitive medical informa-
tion, and some donors may be reluctant to supply accurate information out of fear
that personal aspects of their lives may be disclosed to persons not connected to the
donation process.
Id.
107. See, eg., Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga.
1990) (holding that "plaintiffs' need for the information... does not outweigh defend-
ant's concern with protecting the adequacy and safety of the blood supply"); Coleman
v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (same); Krygier v.
Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) ("[S]ociety's interest in
maintaining the free flow of volunteer blood far outweigh[s] the plaintiff's right to the
disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution of her suit.").
108. 130 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
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notified her of a possible problem with the blood used in her transfu-
sion."° At the time of donation, the blood supply community was
aware of the virus and the high risk groups, as well as recommended
screening procedures. However, a test detecting the HIV infection was
not yet in existence. 110 The donor tested HIV positive in a subsequent
blood donation, causing the defendant to contact the donor for addi-
tional information and notify all recipients of the donor's blood.111
The plaintiffs' sought the identity of the blood donor in order to prove
negligence and proximate cause.1
12
The Coleman court reasoned that because the potential danger to
the volunteer blood supply system outweighed the plaintiff's discovery
needs, it was unnecessary to reach the question of any potential viola-
tion of the donor's constitutional rights.1 13 The court found compel-
ling the fact that, as a result of confusion over how AIDS is
transmitted and whether AIDS can be contracted by donating blood,
the number of volunteer blood donors has decreased in the last several
years.114 In addition, the Coleman court noted that the exclusion of
persons who are members of groups identified as being at risk for
AIDS has further reduced the available pool of donors.' 15 The court
concluded that the possibility of becoming involved in litigation, along
with the potential for probing questions concerning a person's intimate
life, would dampen potential donors' desire to donate blood. 6 Thus,
the reduction in the number of volunteer donors resulting from disclo-
sure would clearly compromise the adequacy of the national blood sup-
ply. 117 Moreover, the court pointed out that donors will be less candid
when providing health information, thereby compromising public
109. Id. at 361.
110. Id. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text for a historical discussion of
the AIDS virus.
111. 130 F.R.D. at 361. See also supra note 32, for a discussion of the "look-back"
program.
112. 130 F.R.D. at 361.
113. Id. at 362.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 377 (Wash. 1991)
(blood bank contending that "prudent, but overly inclusive measures, used to screen for
AIDS and other infectious diseases, have reduced the donor base by excluding many
healthy donors," (quoting Clerk's Papers, at 1995)).
116. 130 F.R.D. at 362.
117. Id. at 363.
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safety.'1
8
Although maintaining a safe and adequate blood supply is a real and
vital societal concern, the fear of disclosure may not have such a gross
effect on the nation's blood supply. In Doe v. Puget Sound Blood
Center,"9 the Supreme Court of Washington expressly found that the
blood institutions presented no factual support for the assertions that
disclosure of donor identity would lead to fewer donations and en-
courage false information. 2 The Puget Sound court stated that these
predictions bordered on speculation about basic human conduct in re-
sponse to a limited discovery order. 12  Furthermore, the court indi-
cated that the societal interest in a safe blood supply may be promoted
because potential discovery would only deter high risk donors. 2 2 This
fact, in conjunction with rapidly changing medical technology designed
to detect false information and prevent contaminated blood from
reaching the blood supply, convinced the court to affirm the discovery
order. 123
The fear of contracting AIDS may decrease one's willingness to do-
nate. Because donating blood is a charitable act, however, assurances
that their identities will remain confidential is not the donors' primary
118. Id. See also Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La.
1990) (explaining that donors may not provide accurate information if they are fearful
of becoming a party to a lawsuit or subjecting their personal lives to investigation). The
Laburre court explained that:
There is a strong possibility that questions [relating to medical history, drug use,
and sexual activity which would indicate possible disease] would not be answered
honestly if the donors believed that their records could be subpoenaed or the an-
swers could be made public. It is essential that volunteer donors disclose accu-
rately and candidly any information concerning their sexual activity, drug use, and
any other activities that have been linked to the transmission of certain diseases
Id. But see Most v. Tulane Medical Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991) (distinguish-
ing Laburre and holding that public policy interests do not outweigh an AIDS victim's
need to discover a blood donor's identity).
119. 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991).
120. Id. at 377-78.
121. Id. at 379.
122. Id. See also Jenner, supra note 52, at 50 (asserting that "[i]f fear of disclosure
deters those in high-risk groups for AIDS from donating blood, the societal interest in a
safe blood supply is promoted"). But see Kirsh, supra note 23, at 208. The author
explains that "because many AIDS-carrying donors are unaware that they have the
disease, the possibility of disclosing their identities will not necessarily deter them from
donating blood any more than it will deter non-carriers." Id.
123. 819 P.2d at 379.
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consideration.124 Safety should be the primary concern in maintaining
the blood supply. A blood supply contaminated with the AIDS virus
surely cannot be labeled "adequate." Moreover, the blood industry has
not pointed to any authority to confirm that blood donations would
decrease if donors knew that they might be questioned later about the
circumstances of their donations.125 The dissent in the Rasmussen
lower court was cognizant of the blood industry's tenuous argu-
ment. 26 The dissenting judge remarked that if a potential donor is not
in a high risk group, the donor will unhesitatingly give blood irrespec-
tive of the outcome of these AIDS-related blood donation cases. 127
Discouraging high risk donors by the potential disclosure of their iden-
tity achieves the blood industry's and society's ultimate goal of keeping
a safe and healthy blood supply.
128
V. FORMULAS FOR RESOLVING THE COMPETING INTERESTS
Both opponents and proponents of allowing plaintiffs to discover the
identity of the blood donor in AIDS-related litigation present plausible
arguments. As previously noted, however, courts have the duty of bal-
ancing competing interests and finding a viable solution.1 29 A blood
donor should not be subjected to the embarrassment and humiliation
124. Laburre v. East Jefferson Medical Hosp., 564 So. 2d 302, 302 (La. 1990) (Den-
nis, J., dissenting) (questioning the potential existence of a negative impact on donations
due to possible disclosure). The majority opinion in Laburre found that fear of being
called into litigation and subjected to questioning about intimate details of their per-
sonal lives would act as a disincentive to voluntary blood donations and "could drasti-
cally affect the supply of blood donations." Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1384.
125. Jenner, supra note 52, at 50. See also Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563
A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that the court cannot perceive a correlation
between limited protective orders and a reduced number of blood donations).
126. South Florida Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003,
1012-13 (Colo. 1988). "[S]ociety as a whole also has an interest consistent with that of
[the plaintiffs]; namely, that of maintaining a safe blood supply. [Blood banks] cannot
claim absolute immunity from discovery when it is in the business of providing a prod-
uct capable of transmitting disease." Id. See also Jenner, supra note 52 at 50. "Public
policy should promote safety and health. If the blood industry is permitted to escape
scrutiny... it will continue to move slowly in conquering problems that affect its blood
products. By refusing to disclose relevant information, blood banks are attempting to
immunize themselves, or at least minimize their liability." id.
129. Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1012. See also supra notes 23-29 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the interests involved in court balancing measures.
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that ensues when identified as an AIDS carrier. Likewise, the availa-
bility of an adequate and safe blood supply is a fundamental need to
society. 130 However, opponents of discovery fail to properly emphasize
a plaintiff's right to obtain compensation for contracting a disease from
which the plaintiff will never recover.13 ' No known cure is available
for the AIDS virus. 132 No amount of money can fully compensate an
AIDS victim or the family for the anguish they must endure. The abil-
ity to fairly and fully litigate their claims is the least that society can do
for the victims of a contaminated blood transfusion.1 33
In promoting fairness, courts can tailor a limited discovery proce-
dure to protect the rights of all parties.13 For example, in Belle Bon-
fils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court,135 the Supreme Court of
Colorado ordered plaintiffs to submit written questions to the clerk of
the district court. 136 The questions were to be carefully crafted so that
the identity of the donor would not be revealed. The blood center's
130. 763 P.2d at 1012.
131. Courts denying discovery have found that the plaintiff's interest is modest in
comparison to the potential injury to the donor and to the nation's blood supply. See,
e.g., Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 657 (D.S.C. 1989)
(explaining that society's interest often outweighs the interests of individuals using dis-
covery techniques to prove claims for compensatory damages); Doe v. University of
Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff has very
little interest in discovering the donor's name when the suit is against a blood bank);
Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987) (finding the
probative value of the discovery "dubious at best").
132. See Dieringer, supra note 5, at 623 (noting that death inevitably follows a long
and agonizing illness).
133. Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990),
aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
The ultimate point of course is that plaintiff has suffered a most grievous harm
which was apparently inflicted upon him by this donor, whether unwittingly or not
.... The degree of plaintiff's injury, his right to redress from those who may have
negligently failed to protect him, and his need for information which only the do-
nor can provide if redress is to be obtained, all justify the limited disclosure we here
sanction without unduly prejudicing the interests of the public and the donor's
privacy rights.
Id.
134. See Zwart, supra note 12, at 886-87. The author suggests that the trial judge
may view the information in camera to determine the probative value and discern
whether the donor was responsible for plaintiff's AIDS. Id. If the donor's "has acted
so irresponsibly so as to effectively kill another human being," the donor has no justifi-
cation to exploit the right to privacy. Id.
135. 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
136. Id. at 1014.
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attorney was to provide the name and address of the donor only to the
clerk, who in turn would mail the questions to the donor.137 After the
donor returned the answered questions, the clerk was to delete any
identifying information, thereby insuring the donor's anonymity.
138
The Belle Bonfils court determined that this was sufficient to satisfy the
competing interests.1
39
Courts have also authorized "veiled" depositions, allowing only the
attorneys and possibly the plaintiffs to question the donor under strict
conditions."4 For example, the donor need only be identified as "Do-
nor X" and need not give any other information suggesting the donor's
identity. 4 ' In addition, a donor who fears that these protective meas-
ures are insufficient may disguise or conceal his or her face from those
present during the deposition.' 4 2 If both parties are cooperative, they
may also be able to suggest further limitations on the inquiry and tech-
nique to afford the plaintiff a reasonable discovery opportunity at the
least possible cost to the donor's confidentiality interests.' 4 3 Thus, any
fear of public disclosure is abolished. Moreover, since the blood bank,
not the donor, has asserted the donor's right to privacy, the donor may
be willing to provide the necessary information'"
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 763 P.2d at 1014. See also Quintana v. United Blood Serv., 811 P.2d 424, 432
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "[i]n order to obtain sufficient information regarding
a blood bank's screening and testing procedures, a patient is entitled to have controlled
access to the donor for discovery, from the donor's perspective, whether screening pro-
cedures were followed"). But see Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1019 (Quinn, C.J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[a]ny discovery directed against the donor holds out the prospect for
the pursuit of further leads uncovered in the course of limited discovery that could
easily result in disclosing to the public at large the identity of the donor as a person
infected with AIDS or HIV related illness").
140. See, eg., Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989)
(allowing a donor to be deposed without giving identifying information); Snyder v.
Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (permitting a veiled
deposition with the court limiting areas of questioning and imposing conditions to in-
sure the donors' anonymity), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (allowing trial court to formulate
an order protecting donor's identity but permitting plaintiffs to learn of screening proce-
dures); Gulf Coast Regional Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988) (allowing discovery but prohibiting public disclosure).
141. Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126.
142. Id. See also Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 818 P.2d 1056,
1061 (Wash. 1991) (allowing a videotaped deposition with the donor's face obscured).
143. Snyder, 582 A.2d at 315.
144. Id. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case in
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The ability to depose the blood donor under limited circumstances
clearly benefits the plaintiff without causing undue hardship to the do-
nor.45 Recently, a jury in Nevada awarded one million dollars to a
man who had contracted AIDS after receiving an HIV-infected blood
donation.146 The jury reached its decision after hearing the anony-
mous donor's telephone deposition. 47 Although the emergence of the
HIV antibody test has significantly reduced AIDS-contaminated blood
transfusions,1 48 the list of plaintiffs contracting AIDS from transfu-
sions prior to 1985 is still growing. 49 They are all entitled to have
their day in court. In some instances, information supplied by the
blood banks may be sufficient for a plaintiff to prove negligence absent
direct information from the donor. 5° Where the blood bank is unco-
operative, however, the donor's deposition may be the plaintiff's only
hope of recovery. 5 ' Given the protective measures available in discov-
ery, courts should apply more weight to plaintiffs' vital interests.
which the donor testified on plaintiff's behalf. See also Snyder, 593 A.2d 318, 334 (N.J.
1991) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (stating that, although he disfavors disclosure, a willing
witness may provide the requested information by waiving the privacy protections).
145. Because the identity of the donor remains anonymous, concerns about embar-
rassment or discrimination are alleviated. See Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes,
734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
146. Clark v. United Blood Serv., 5 AIDS Policy and Law (BNA) No. 8, 1 (May 2,
1990).
147. Id.
148. See Andresen, supra note 28, at 587. The author correctly asserts that
although the lawsuits have just started to surface, the accuracy of the HIV test has
diminished blood-borne AIDS transmissions. Id. Therefore, the fear that donors will
stop giving blood because of the possibility of later questioning is no longer an issue. Id.
See also Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 381 (Wash. 1991) (Dore, C.J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that the issues are not moot because they are pressing matters of
important public concern and numerous blood banks will face discovery issues as the
AIDS epidemic increases).
149. Andresen, supra note 28, at 587.
150. See, eg., Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78 (N.D. Ga.
1990) (finding that adequate information is available concerning the Red Cross without
disclosure of donors' identities). But see Boutte v. Blood Systems, Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122,
126 (W.D. La. 1989) (stating that "the infected donor is one of only two people who
knows whether the screening procedures were followed" and that the information will
promote a just outcome and ensure that blood suppliers establish the highest standards
of care).
151. Snyder v. Mejhkian, 582 A.2d 307, 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (find-
ing that "[t]he degree of plaintiff's injury, his right to redress from those who may have
negligently failed to protect him, and his need for information which only the donor can
provide ... all justify the limited disclosure"), aff'd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
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Although plaintiffs contend that recovery may only be achieved
through discovery of the donors' names and addresses, the discovery
procedures crafted by recent courts will enable plaintiffs to successfully
attain their goals. In doing so, potential donors may be assured that
courts will preserve donor anonymity in AIDS-related cases and,
therefore, these cases should neither infringe on a donor's right to pri-
vacy nor deter donors from contributing to the nation's volunteer
blood supply.
CONCLUSION
Cases involving AIDS-related blood donations are tragic and the
stakes are high. Blood services may lose significant amounts of money
and plaintiffs will inevitably lose their lives. But, within the proper
confines of the courts, the donor loses nothing. The plaintiff does not
seek redress from the donors and, consequently, does not threaten vol-
unteer blood donors with a lawsuit.152 If the donor became a party to
the action, courts should then give more weight to the interests of pri-
vacy and an adequate blood supply.153 In the meantime, the scale tips
in favor of the plaintiffs and they should have the opportunity to seek
pertinent information from the blood donor.
Furthermore, AIDS-related cases involving blood recipients who
seek the identity of blood donors will soon dissipate.154 With the dis-
covery of the HIV test and the subsequent provisions mandating the
testing of all donated blood, the number of recipients contracting
AIDS from blood transfusions has significantly decreased.155 There-
fore, court decisions allowing limited discovery are not opening a Pan-
dora's Box, setting a precedent with devastating future effects. The
unfortunate plaintiffs that required blood transfusions before the medi-
cal industry had conclusive facts about the transmission and detection
of AIDS have a compelling interest in discovery from the blood donor.
Amy L. Fisher*
152. Id.
153. See Jenner, supra note 52, at 52 (stating that the dangers are more obvious
when the donor is named as a defendant).
154. Andresen, supra note 28, at 587.
155. See supra note 10 for a discussion of the statutory requirements for blood
donations.
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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